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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Steven Reid Briggs entered in a conditional plea of guilty to felony driving under 
the influence (hereinafter, DUI), preserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress the results of the forcible blood draw conducted upon him. The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Briggs. On 
appeal, Mr. Briggs asserts that the district court erred in denying Mr. Briggs' motion to 
suppress the results of his forcible blood draw. As such, Mr. Briggs' respectfully 
requests that this Court modify or overrule State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P .3d 739 
(2007) for the reasons articulated herein. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On November 1, 2008, Officer Joshua Deede 1 while working as private security 
for the Colonial Theater observed a vehicle that was attempting to exit the parking lot, 
come into contact with "the chain that divides the parking lot with the pedestrian 
sidewalk" and drive up onto the sidewalk. (Prelim. Tr., p.7, Ls.17-25, p.9, Ls.1-20.)2 
Officer Deede asked for assistance because he was not officially on duty at that time. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.11, Ls.16-23.) Officer Lynn Case responded and testified that upon 
arriving at the scene, "Mr. Briggs was in the back seat of Officer Miller's car 
handcuffed." (Prelim. Tr., p.16, Ls.6-22.) Officer Case testified "While he was busy 
swearing at me and insulting me, I noticed that his speech was slurred. He was loud 
1 Officer Deede was employed by the City of Idaho Falls. (Prelim. Tr., p.6, Ls.20-22.) 
2 The 12/19/10 transcript of Mr. Briggs' preliminary hearing is cited herein as "Prelim. 
Tr.," for ease of reference. 
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and sloppy in his speech and movements. Very strong odor of alcoholic beverage, 
bloodshot glassy eyes, and he had urinated in his pants." (Prelim Tr., p.17, Ls.4-16.) 
Mr. Briggs "vehemently" refused to exit the vehicle and would not respond when asked 
if he would take a breath test. (Prelim. Tr., p.17, L.20 - p.18, L.18.) Officer Case then 
advised Mr. Briggs that he would be taken for a blood draw. (Prelim. Tr., p.18, Ls.14-
16.) 
Officer Case testified as to Mr. Briggs' conduct while sitting in the back of the 
patrol car after being informed he would be taken for a blood draw: 
He wouldn't sit back in the seat. Laid there on the seat kicking at 
us. We were able to catch his legs. He wouldn't fold them up so we could 
close the door. I eventually had to hit him in the back of the knee to get 
that leg to fold up, and we got that done, but as soon as I closed the door, 
he pushed off of that door, stuck his head and shoulders off out the other 
door and now the fight is on to try to get that door closed. Absolutely 
refused to cooperate, just screaming, yelling, cussing, swearing. We 
eventually managed to get him sitting up enough to close the door and 
transported him to the EIRMC. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.6-17.) Once officers arrived got to EIRMC, Mr. Briggs "refused to 
exit the vehicle. We had to actually pull him out and put him face down on a gurney to 
get him inside the hospital for the blood draw." (Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.20-23.) Officer 
Case testified that Mr. Briggs' "cussing and swearing and threatening continued, along 
with sexual innuendos about our mothers and our sisters." (Prelim. Tr., p.20, Ls.1-3.) 
Ultimately, once the phlebotomist arrived, "Mr. Briggs had to be held down by several 
officers for the blood draw to be done."3 (Prelim Tr., p.20, Ls.4-10.) 
3 According to the arguments made by both the State and defense counsel, it appears 
as though it took five officers to hold Mr. Briggs down to conduct the forcible blood draw. 
(Tr., p.11, Ls.2-5, p.14, Ls.24-25.) 
2 
Mr. Briggs was charged by Information with felony DUI, wherein the State alleged 
that Mr. Briggs had been convicted of two prior DUl's within the previous ten years. 
(R., pp.17-19.) Defense counsel for Mr. Briggs filed a motion to suppress, arguing the 
results of the forcible blood draw conducted upon him following his arrest for suspicion 
of DUI should be suppressed because the blood draw was not permitted by Idaho 
statutory authority and was conducted in an excessive manner. (R., pp.28-29.) The 
State filed a response and the district court entered an order denying Mr. Briggs 
suppression motion. (R., pp.36-38, 43.) Mr. Briggs then entered a conditional plea of 
guilty to felony DUI, specifically preserving his right to appeal the district court's denial 
of his suppression motion. (R., pp.51-52; Tr., p.31, L.13 - p.32, L.4.) The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Briggs. 
(R., pp.58-61.) Mr. Briggs filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's 
Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.61-63.) 
3 
ISSUES 
1) Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Briggs' motion to suppress the results 
of the forcible blood draw because the forcible blood draw violated his fourth 
amendment rights as outlined in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)? 
2) Assuming Schmerber permits nonconsensual, warrantless blood draws in simple 
DUI offenses not involving an injury or accident, did the district court err denying 
the motion to suppress where the State failed to prove exigent circumstances 
justified subverting the warrant requirement in Mr. Briggs' case? 
3) Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Briggs' motion to suppress the results 





The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Briggs' Motion To Suppress The Results Of The 
Forcible Blood Draw Because The Forcible Blood Draw Violated His Fourth Amendment 
Rights As Outlined In Schmerber 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Briggs asserts that the district court erred denying his suppression motion 
because the forcible blood draw violated his constitutional right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures as outlined in Schmerber. 
B. The Fourth Amendment Protects Individuals From Unreasonable Forcible Blood 
Draws 
Neither this Court through broad interpretation, nor the State through legislative 
enactments, can reduce or rescind the minimal, basic, and fundamental protections 
against unreasonable searches and seizures granted to all citizens, irrespective of their 
domicile, by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Ybarra v. 
11/inois, 444 U.S. 85, 96 n.11 (1979) (state statute which purports to authorize police in 
some circumstances to make searches and seizures without probable cause and 
without search warrants falls within the category of statutes "purporting to authorize 
searches without probable cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as 
authority for unconstitutional searches."). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects people, not 
places, from unwarranted governmental intrusions. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 
96 n.5 (1990) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)); State v. Pruss, 145 
Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008). Fourth Amendment protections are 
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secured by the constitutional requirement that all searches and seizures be reasonable. 
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless they fall within a 
specifically established and well-delineated exception to the warrant requirement. 
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Murphy, 129 Idaho 861, 863, 
934 P.2d 34, 36 (Ct. App. 1997). When a warrantless search or seizure has occurred, 
the State bears a heavy burden to justify dispensing with the warrant requirement. 
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749-750 (1984); State v. Curl, 125 Idaho 224, 225, 
869 P.2d 224, 225 (1993). 
It is without question that "[t]he taking of a blood alcohol content test is a seizure 
within the context of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution." State v. 
Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 370, 775 P.2d 1210, 1212 (1989) (citations omitted) As the 
United States Supreme Court recognized in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 
(1966): 
It could not reasonably be argued, and indeed respondent does not argue, 
that the administration of the blood test in this case was free of the 
constraints of the Fourth Amendment. Such testing procedures plainly 
constitute searches of 'persons,' and depend antecedently upon seizures 
of 'persons,' within the meaning of that Amendment. 
384 U.S. at 767. 
C. The United States Supreme Court Recognizes That The Fourth Amendment 
Protects Individuals From Unreasonable Forcible Blood Draws 
Schmerber was only the second case to be considered by the United States 
Supreme Court on the question of whether forcible blood draws violate an individual's 
Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures, but it was 
also the last. In the first case, Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 439-440 (1957), the 
6 
petitioner was driving a truck that collided with a passenger car, killing all three 
occupants of the car and seriously injuring the petitioner. Id. at 433. Officers found a 
nearly empty whiskey bottle in the glove compartment of the petitioner's truck, and the 
smell of alcohol was detected on the petitioner's breath at the hospital. Id. The 
petitioner's blood was drawn by a physician, at the request of a police officer, while the 
petitioner was unconscious and results revealed the petitioner's blood alcohol content to 
be .17. Id. The petitioner challenged the admission of the blood test results at his trial, 
arguing the blood draw was involuntary and violated his Due Process rights. Id. The 
United States Supreme Court held that blood test results were admissible in the 
petitioner's involuntary manslaughter prosecution because New Mexico had validly 
declined to adopt the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations. Id. at 439-
440. In determining that the blood draw was not offensive to due process, the Court 
emphasized the fact that the blood was drawn under the protective eye of the physician, 
and not done in a manner that would shock the conscience or be considered a method 
of obtaining evidence that would offend a sense of justice. Id. at 438. 
Subsequently, the Court directly addressed the blood draw as a Fourth 
Amendment issue. In Schmerber, the petitioner and a companion had been drinking at 
a bar at a bowling alley. 384 U.S. at 758 n.2. After the pair left the bowling alley, the car 
which the petitioner was driving skidded, crossed the road, and struck a tree. Id. Both 
the petitioner and his companion were injured and taken to the hospital for treatment.4 
4 While this incident was charged as misdemeanor driving under the influence of 
alcohol, it should be noted that the offense occurred in 1964 and there is no indication 
that state law, at the time, included a more serious offense of causing an accident or 
injury while DUI. Of course, the underlying facts of the offense in Schmerber are more 
serious than a simple misdemeanor DUI. 
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Id. At the hospital, a police officer directed a physician to draw a blood sample from the 
petitioner. Id. at 758. The results revealed a percent by weight of alcohol in the 
petitioner's blood, which indicated intoxication, and such results were admitted at 
petitioner's trial. Id. at 759. The petitioner objected to the admission of the results, 
arguing that his blood was drawn despite his refusal to consent to the test. Id. 
The Schmerber Court found no violation stemming from the warrantless taking of 
the petitioner's blood under the unique facts of the case. Specifically, the Court relied on 
the destruction of blood evidence as a relevant factor in the exigency determination 
under the following circumstances: the officer investigating the accident encountered 
the defendant at the accident scene; the defendant smelled of alcohol; the passenger in 
defendant's car was injured and taken to the hospital; the investigating officer arrived at 
the hospital where defendant was being treated almost two hours after the accident; 
and finally, the defendant was placed under arrest. The Schmerber Court, without citing 
to any authority, stated: 
We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to 
diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to 
eliminate it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where 
time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate 
the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and 
secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt 
to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an 
appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest. 
Id. at 771 (emphasis added). 5 
5 It is important to remember that Schmerber was decided in 1966. More than 40 years 
have passed since the decision, and technology in the scientific and medical fields has 
advanced exponentially. While the court in 1966 may have been justified in relying 
upon the destruction of blood evidence as a factor in the exigent circumstance analysis 
excusing the warrant requirement, the state of technology, advancements in medical 
and scientific technology over the past 40 years vitiate the propriety of such a strenuous 
reliance. 
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Before broadly applying the analysis of Schmerber to any other case or facts, 
however, it is important to remember the Court's final admonition: 
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on 
the facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is 
a cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution 
does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under 
stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more 
substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
D. The Idaho Supreme Court Case Law Comported With The Limitations The 
United States Supreme Court Placed On Forcible Blood Draws Until It Issued 
Diaz. And To The Extent Diaz Does Not Comport With The Fourth Amendment 
Or Schmerber. It Should Be Modified Or Overruled 
Since Schmerber was issued in 1966, Idaho courts have struggled to identify 
limits on the scope of forcible evidentiary testing in DUI prosecutions and driver license 
suspension hearings. The Idaho Supreme Court appears to have first addressed the 
ability of an individual to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration 
in the context of driver's license revocation matter. See State v. Ankney, 109 Idaho 1, 
704 P.2d 333 (1985). In Ankney, the defendant argued that he had shown cause for 
refusing to take the evidentiary test when he testified that he did not know whether he 
had a constitutional right to refuse the test and he did not understand the refusal form 
that was read to him. Id. at 3, 704 P.2d at 335. As a result, the defendant argued that 
his driver's license should not have been suspended because of his refusal to submit to 
an evidentiary test. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that "[u]nder 
Ankney's reading of the statute, any justification for not taking the test would be 
sufficient to excuse a person from the test. This interpretation is contrary to both good 
sense and the rules of statutory construction." Id. at 6, 704 P.2d at 338. 
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A few months later, in State v. Tierney, 109 Idaho 474, 708 P.2d 879 (1985), the 
Idaho Supreme Court again considered the right to refuse evidentiary testing for alcohol 
in the context of a driver's license suspension. In Tierney, the defendant refused to 
submit to evidentiary testing for alcohol concentration and a result, his driver's license 
was seized and suspended. Id. at 476, 708 P.2d at 881. The defendant challenged his 
license suspension, and the court held a hearing at which the defendant testified that he 
declined the test because (1) he was intoxicated, and (2) he was on medications he 
believed might affect the outcome of the test. Id. The defendant's testimony was 
corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend and an acquaintance. Id. at 447, 708 
P.2d at 882. The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the defendant's 
"justifications for refusing to submit to the test do not constitute 'cause' for refusal to 
submit to the test." Id. (citing Ankney, 109 Idaho at 1, 704 P.2d at 333). 
The Idaho Supreme Court next considered the ability of an individual to refuse to 
submit to a blood-alcohol test, again in the civil context, in In re Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 
744 P.2d 92 (1987). In Griffiths, the defendant's driver's license was suspended based 
on his refusal to take a test to determine his blood alcohol content. Id. at 365, 744 P.2d 
at 93. The defendant appealed the suspension to the magistrate court, which held a 
hearing and considered testimony from police officers, including the arresting officer, the 
defendant, and the defendant's mother. Id. at 366-367, 744 P.2d at 94-95. The 
defendant and his mother both testified that he had a fear of needles, and the defendant 
testified that was the reason he refused to submit to the blood draw. Id. The magistrate 
found that fear of needles was not, as a matter of law, reason to refuse a blood-alcohol 
test. Id. at 367, 744 P.2d at 95. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "a fear of 
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needles may establish sufficient cause for refusing to submit to a blood test requested 
pursuant to I.C. §18-8002 if the fear is of such a magnitude that as a practical matter the 
defendant is psychologically unable to submit to the test, and if the fear is sufficiently 
articulated to the police officer at the time of the refusal so that the officer is given an 
opportunity to request a different test." Id. at 372, 744 P.2d at 100. Notably, the 
Griffiths Court acknowledged that the language of I.C. § 18-8002(3), formerly codified 
as I.C. §49-352, which allowed a defendant to show cause why he or she refused an 
evidentiary test, "had meaning in and of itself, and by itself established grounds for 
refusal." Id. The Court further noted that "[i]t seems self-evident that the legislature has 
authorized the seizure of a license only where the defendant has refused a requested 
test after being properly informed." Id. In sum, the Griffiths Court recognized the ability 
of a driver to refuse to submit to an evidentiary test for blood alcohol content. 
It was not until 1989, that the Court addressed a defendant's ability to refuse to 
submit to evidentiary testing for blood alcohol content in the criminal context. See 
State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 775 P.2d 1210 (1989). In Woolery, the defendant was 
driving a truck at a high rate of speed through an intersection and failed to stop at the 
stop sign. Id. The defendant's vehicle crashed into the victim's car, killing the victim's 
passenger and seriously injuring the victim. Id. The defendant suffered head and chest 
injuries and was transported to Mercy Medical Center for treatment. Id. at 369, 775 
P.2d at 1211. An officer at the scene followed the ambulance to Mercy Medical Center 
and told the defendant's treating physician that he needed a blood test sample from the 
defendant. Id. The sample was drawn and revealed that the defendant's blood alcohol 
content was over the legal limit. Id. The defendant challenged the admissibility of the 
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test results, arguing that he did not consent to the blood test. Id. at 370, 775 P.2d at 
1212. 
At a hearing, the State stipulated that the defendant was not provided with the 
advisory rights contained in I.C. §18-8002 when his blood was drawn, and the testimony 
of the officer established the defendant was not under arrest at the time of the blood 
draw. Id. The lower court denied the defendant's motion to suppress. On appeal, the 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding that: "[i]n the instant situation, the destruction of 
the evidence by metabolism of alcohol in the blood provides an inherent exigency which 
justifies the warrantless search." Id. As a result, the Court concluded that the relevant 
questions were whether there was sufficient justification for ordering the testing, and 
whether the test was conducted in a reasonable manner. Id. at 371, 775 P.2d at 1213. 
The legislature acknowledged [in I.C. § 18-8002] that some individuals 
refuse to comply with their previously granted [implied] consent to submit 
to an evidentiary test. Rather than condone a physical conflict, the 
legislature provided for the administrative revocation of the license 
of an individual who refuses to comply with his previously given 
consent. Such legislative acknowledgement was not meant to hamstring 
the ability of law enforcement to properly investigate and obtain evidence 
of serious crimes committed by those individuals who have chosen 
to drink and drive. 
For the driver who has been involved in an accident which causes either 
serious injury or death, the state must have the usual authority to 
investigate and collect evidence which exists in any other felony 
investigation. Thus, a driver's refusal to peacefully submit to an 
evidentiary test should not preclude law enforcement from making a 
probable cause seizure of his blood. 
Id. at 373-374, 775 P.2d at 1215-1216 (emphasis added). 
In State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009, 793 P.2d 682 (1990), the Idaho 
Supreme Court considered a challenge to applicability of I.C. § 18-8002 on Indian 
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reservations. In considering the jurisdictional issue, the Court also considered whether 
the breath alcohol tests were admissible against the defendants. The defendants had 
voluntarily submitted to the tests after being advised that the failure to do so would 
result in a 180 day driver's license suspension. Id. at 1010, 793. P.2d at 683. In 
addressing the implied consent provision, the Court noted that "[a]lthough under 
I.C. § 18-8002(3) a driver has the physical ability to refuse to submit to an evidentiary 
test, that section did not create statutory right in a driver to withdraw his implied consent 
or refuse to submit to an evidentiary test to determine his blood alcohol level." Id. at 
1013-1014, 793 P.2d at 686-687 (citing Woolery, 116 Idaho at 368, 775 P.2d at 1210). 
Both Griffith and Woolery comported with United States Supreme Court precedent and 
the United States Constitution. 
Subsequent appellate cases addressing refusals to submit to evidentiary testing 
for blood alcohol content arose in the context of simple driving under the influence of 
alcohol charges not involving accidents, or in license revocation proceedings. See, e.g., 
State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 973 P.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1999) (defendant charged 
with DUI first refused and then consented to breath test only after being ordered to do 
so by his parole officer; consent was not involuntary and results were admissible 
because the defendant had impliedly consented to such testing by driving a car on 
Idaho highways, and "although an individual has the physical ability to prevent a test, 
there is no legal right to withdraw the statutorily implied consent."); State v. Halen, 136 
Idaho 829, 41 P .3d 257 (2002) (affirming driver's license suspension based on driver's 
refusal to submit to blood draw based on dislike for needles, where driver's dislike of 
needles did not constitute a "psychological inability to submit to the [blood] test" and did 
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not demonstrate cause for refusing test); State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 65 P.3d 
211 (Ct. App. 2002) (warrantless forcible blood draw of defendant charged with felony 
DUI, where three officers and two nurses held defendant down, and physical restraints 
were used to accomplish forcible blood draw, not violative of Fourth Amendment due to 
exigent circumstances or implied consent, and draw not unreasonable). 
In 2007, despite the clear constitutional standards adopted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Griffiths and Woolery, which were based on Schmerber and 
grounded in the Fourth Amendment, the Idaho Supreme Court abandoned those 
standards in State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007). In Diaz, the defendant 
was suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol and was transported by the 
officer to a local hospital where his blood was drawn. Id. at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. The 
defendant did not physically resist either being transported to the hospital, or the taking 
of his blood, but protested the blood draw. Id. The Defendant was ultimately charged 
with felony DUI based on prior convictions, and he sought to suppress his blood test 
results, arguing that the test was involuntary and not justified by exigent circumstances. 
Id. 
The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the blood draw could be 
justified either by exigent circumstances or consent. Id. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 
P.3d at 471. Because the defendant had "given his implied consent to evidentiary 
testing by driving on an Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw." Id. at 
303, 160 P.3d at 742. Given the Court's finding that the forcible blood draw was 
consensual, the Court went on to consider the reasonableness of the blood draw under 
the Fourth Amendment, in light of the totality of the circumstances including: (1) 
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whether the procedure was done in a medically acceptable manner; and (2) whether the 
procedure was done without unreasonable force. Id. Finding the blood draw to be 
reasonable, the Court then considered whether I.C. § 18-8002(6)(b) permits officers to 
order involuntary blood draws absent offenses such as aggravated DUI or vehicular 
manslaughter. The Court found that the statute provides NO protection to drivers, but 
only to hospital professionals, and does nothing more than limit when an officer may 
request, rather than order, hospital personnel to draw a driver's blood against the 
driver's will. Id. at 303-304, 160 P.3d at 742-743. 
The Court's decision in Diaz is contrary to Schmerber, its own precedent (see 
Griffiths; Woolery), and it renders portions of Idaho Code irrelevant and superfluous. It 
is not disputed that in Idaho, as is true in every other state, by driving a motor vehicle on 
the roadways (or in some jurisdictions, by obtaining a driver's license), a driver consents 
to evidentiary testing of his or her blood, breath and urine for the presence of alcohol or 
intoxicating substances, when an officer has reasonable grounds, or probable cause, to 
believe the driver is intoxicated. See Idaho Code §§ 18-8002(1 ), -8002A(e); M. 
Elizabeth Fuller, Comment, Implied Consent Statutes: What is Refusal?, 9 AM. J. OF 
TRIAL Aovoc. 423,424 FN.12 (1986) (identifying and citing to implied consent statutes in 
every state). 
In exchange for the privilege of driving on the roadways of a given state, or in 
exchange for the privilege of a driver's license, a driver impliedly consents to submit to 
evidentiary testing so long as that testing is legally justified. Id. Despite the existence 
of implied consent laws, the vast majority of states have nevertheless found that an 
individual may refuse to submit to evidentiary testing, so long as they are advised that 
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the failure to submit to testing will result in a civil penalty and driver's license 
suspension. See, e.g., Pena, v. State, 684 P.2d 864 (Alaska 1984) (chemical sobriety 
test results inadmissible in manslaughter prosecution of defendant who refused to take 
test); State v. Estrada, 100 P.3d 452 (Ariz. Ct. Ap. Div. 2 2004) (blood test results in DUI 
prosecution inadmissible when blood drawn without warrant while defendant received 
medical treatment against his will); State v. Slaney, 653 So.2d 422 (Fla. Dist. Ct. Appl. 
3d Dist. 1995) (blood test results inadmissible in DUI prosecution where driver 
consented to blood draw only after being misinformed by officer that statute required 
him to submit to test, rather than telling driver that driver could submit to test); 
Pilkenton v. State, 561 S.E.2d 462 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (in DUI prosecution, evidence 
insufficient to invoke implied consent statute allowing officers to require driver to submit 
to blood test where there is an accident involving serious injury, where driver 
complained of pain in wrist and other driver was bleeding but not seriously injured); 
Hannay v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (implied consent laws could not 
be applied in DUI causing death where officer requesting medical personnel draw 
defendant's blood did not advise defendant of implied consent law and did not seek 
defendant's actual consent); People v. Wade, 460 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. 1983) (under 
implied consent law if officer has reasonable grounds to believe driver is DUI, officer 
may have a blood sample withdrawn by appropriate professional within two hours of 
arrest for results to be admissible but officer MUST honor conscious suspect's wish to 
refuse test); State v. Shantie, 92 P.3d 746 (Ore. 2004) (defendant's refusal to consent 
to blood draw did not render blood draw results inadmissible in DUI trial under implied 
consent law where the evidence was obtained pursuant to a warrant); State v. Mullins, 
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489 S.E. 2d 923 (S.C. 1997) (under implied consent statute, once driver refused blood 
tests, no chemical tests could be performed and results were inadmissible in DUI trial); 
Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (implied consent statute did 
not preclude taking of blood sample pursuant to search warrant and thus results were 
admissible in DUI prosecution even where driver did not consent; implied consent 
statute did not provide greater protection than fourth amendment). 
Indeed, both Idaho Code and case law recognize that individuals will refuse to 
submit to evidentiary testing. See Idaho Code §18-8002(3) ("At the time evidentiary 
testing ... is requested, the person shall be informed that if he refuses to submit to or if 
he fails to complete, evidentiary testing .... "); I.C. §18-8002(4) ("If the motorist refuses 
to submit to or complete evidentiary testing .... "); I.C. §18-8002A(2) ("At the time of 
evidentiary testing ... is requested, the person shall be informed that if the person 
refuses to submit to or fails to complete evidentiary testing .... "); I.C. §18-8004(2) 
("Any person who does not take a test to determine alcohol concentration or whose test 
result is determined by the court to be unreliable or inadmissible against him .... "); 
Griffiths, 113 Idaho at 370, 744 P.2d at 98.; but see State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302-
303, 160 P.3d 739, 741-742 (2007) (holding that pursuant to I.C. §18-8002(1), by 
driving a vehicle, the defendant impliedly consented to evidentiary testing for alcohol 
and could not withdraw that consent); Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833, 41 P.3d 257, 
261 (2002) (same in the context of a driver's license suspension challenge where 
defendant refused and did not submit to an alcohol concentration test); State v. 
Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 475, 65 P.3d 211, 216 (Ct. App 2002) ("[The defendant], 
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by virtue of the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant requirement and Idaho's 
implied consent statute, had no legal entitlement to refuse or prevent the blood draw."). 
The only circumstances under which an officer is permitted to require a driver, 
against his or her will, to submit to evidentiary testing is when the officer has probable 
cause to believe the driver has committed one of the following offenses: (1) aggravated 
DUI; (2) vehicular manslaughter where the driver is under the influence; (3) aggravated 
operation of a vessel on the waters of Idaho while the operator is under the influence; 
and (4) criminal homicide involving a vessel on the waters of Idaho while the operator is 
under the influence. See Idaho Code§ 18-8002(6)(b); but see Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303-
304, 160 P.3d at 742-743 (holding that I.C. §18-8002(6)(b) applies and protects medical 
personnel only, and limits when an officer may order medical personnel to administer a 
blood withdrawal, not when an officer can request a blood draw). An officer is permitted 
to compel evidentiary testing under these enumerated circumstances just as he or she 
would be able to do in any other serious felony case. Where an officer has probable 
cause to believe that one of these "serious crimes [has been] committed by those 
individuals who have chosen to drink and drive[,]" and the driver has "been involved 
in an accident which causes either serious injury or death, the state must have the usual 
authority to investigate and collect evidence which exists in any other felony 
investigation." Woolery, 116 Idaho at Id. at 373-374, 775 P.2d at 1215-1216 (emphasis 
added). Thus, the ability of an officer to obtain a blood sample without the express 
consent of a driver, and indeed in the face of the withdrawal of any implied consent, is 
not contingent on the implied consent statute, but rather, hinges on traditional notions of 
probable cause and warrant exceptions. 
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The Diaz Court was simply incorrect in concluding that forcing a defendant to 
submit to a blood draw over his objection could be justified by reliance on the implied 
consent law. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302, 160 P.3d at 471. It is not true that because the 
defendant had "given his implied consent to evidentiary testing by driving on an Idaho 
road, he also gave his consent to a blood draw." Id. at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. In 
reaching its conclusions, the Diaz Court makes the fundamental mistake of conflating 
the concepts of exigent circumstances and consent. 
1. Exigent Circumstances Excuse The Warrant Requirement But Do Not Excuse 
The Probable Cause Requirement 
An exigent circumstance is one in which "the facts known at the time of the 
[warrantless] entry indicate a 'compelling need for official action and no time to secure a 
warrant."'6 State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485-486, 163 P.3d 1194, 1197-1198 (2007) 
(quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)). When a warrantless search is 
justified on the basis of exigent circumstances, the search must also be justified by 
probable cause. State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 504, 975 P.2d 789, 792 (1999) ("The 
exigent circumstances exception refers broadly to fact patterns sufficient to excuse an 
officer form the requirement of obtaining a warrant to conduct a search for which he has 
6 The availability of the telephonic warrant is certainly a factor that must be considered 
in determining whether the circumstances are exigent, i.e., whether officers have time to 
secure a warrant. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771, 778-780 (Utah 2007). 
See United States v. Baker, 520 F.Supp. 1080, 1083 (D.lowa 1981) (finding that one 
hour and fifteen minutes was "abundant time" to obtain warrant by telephone, a process 
that often takes no more than thirty minutes); State v. Flannigan, 978 P.2d 127, 131 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) ("[T]he Mesa Police Department is able to obtain a warrant within 
as little as fifteen minutes and that delays of only fifteen to forty-five minutes are 
commonplace."). "The mere possibility of delay does not give rise to an exigency." 
Flannigan, 978 P .2d at 131. 
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probable cause." (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted)). The scope of a 
warrantless entry or search premised on probable cause and exigent circumstances is 
limited by the exigency that justified the warrantless entry or search at the outset. Id. at 
487, 163 P.3d at 1199 (citations omitted). The dissipation of blood alcohol is not 
sufficient in and of itself to constitute exigent circumstances.7 See, e.g., State v. 
Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771 (Utah 2007). 
2. Voluntary Consent Obviates The Need For Probable Cause 
In contrast, consent is an exception to the probable cause requirement, and thus 
an exception to the warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 
(1973). An officer need not possess probable cause, reasonable suspension, or 
anything more than a hunch before asking a citizen whether he or she will consent to 
search of their person or property. Of course, an individual always has the right to say 
7 The dissipation of alcohol from the human body is accomplished at somewhere 
between the rate of .015% and.018% per hour; although in some individuals the rate 
may be as high as .022%. See RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO FORENSIC SCIENCE 280 (5th ed. 1995). Following the drawing of a blood sample, any 
subsequent testing will reflect the blood alcohol content level at the time of the blood 
draw, but not the level at the time of operation of a motor vehicle. See DAVID R. HARPER 
& JANET E.l. CORRY, COLLECTION AND STORAGE OF SPECIMENS FOR ALCOHOL ANALYSIS, IN 
MEDICOLEGAL ASPECTS OF ALCOHOL DETERMINATION IN BIOLOGICAL SPECIMENS 145, 149 
(James C. Garriott ed. 1993). Fairly simple scientific formulae, known as retrograde 
extrapolation, are employed to convert blood alcohol content results from the time of the 
blood draw to the time of actual physical control over a motor vehicle. LAWRENCE 
TAYLOR, DRUNK DRIVING DEFENSE§ 8.01 (4th ed. 1996). According even to conservative 
estimates, given our knowledge of alcohol dissipation, there exists at least a 3.6 hour 
window of opportunity during which a search warrant can be obtained to obtain a blood 
sample for forensic testing without affecting the integrity of blood alcohol content results. 
Id. § 6.02; see also 49 C.F.R. § 382.209 (1995) (Federal Motor Carrier Safety 
Regulations prohibit drivers who may be required to take a post-accident alcohol test 
from consuming any alcohol for eight hours after an accident, or until the test is 
conducted, whichever is sooner.). 
20 
no. To be valid, consent must be given voluntarily. Smith, 144 Idaho at 488, 163 P.3d 
at 1200. Voluntariness is "a question of fact to be determined in light of all the 
surrounding circumstances." Id. In addition, if a person consents to a search, the 
scope of the consensual "search is generally defined by its expressed object[,]" or by 
limits placed upon the scope of the search by the consenting party. Florida v. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) ("A suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of 
the search to which he consents."). 
In addition to being limited, consent may also be withdrawn. United States v. 
Mcweeney, 454 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that, "a suspect is free ... after 
initially giving consent, to delimit or withdraw his or her consent at anytime," in the 
context of a stop and risk); United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2005) 
("Once given, consent to search may be withdrawn."); United States v. Lockett, 406 
F.3d 907 (3rd Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a suspect retains the right to revoke his 
consent, in the context of a luggage search); United States v. Marshall, 348 F.3d 281 
(1 st Cir. 2003) (same, in the context of a home search); United States v. Bustillos-
Munoz, 235 F.3d 505 (10th Cir. 2000) (same, in the context of a vehicle search); United 
States v. McFarley, 991 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1993) (same, in the context of a luggage 
search). Thus, the scope of a consensual search under the Fourth Amendment is 
determined by standards of objective reasonableness: "what would the typical 
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the 
suspect?" Id. 
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a. Consensual Searches Must Be Reasonable 
Where the State seeks to rely upon voluntary implied consent to support forced 
blood draws under the Fourth Amendment, the State bears the burden not only that the 
consent was voluntary, but that the search conducted falls within the parameters or 
limits of the consent given. Thereafter, assuming the implied consent was voluntary 
and the search was limited to the scope of the consent given, and not otherwise 
withdrawn, the State must further demonstrate the search was reasonable. Jimeno, 
500 U.S. at 250 ('The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."); Diaz, 
144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. 
The voluntariness and scope of the consent along with the reasonableness of the 
search must be evaluated in light of the fact that a State cannot condition the granting of 
a privilege upon the renunciation of a constitutional right to due process. See 
S/ochower v. Bd. Of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956) (striking down statute 
which made the assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination by a city employee 
or agent relating to his or her official duties the functional equivalent of a resignation, 
where statute resulted in conclusive presumption of guilt of one who claimed his or her 
constitutional privilege, such discharge violated due process even though employee had 
no constitutional right to be a City employee). 
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state 
legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the 
citizen of rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution, but to uphold an 
act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a 
surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the state 
threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the 
proposition that, as a general rule, the state, having power to deny a 
privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to 
impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and one 
of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the 
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relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the state may compel the 
surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in 
like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties 
embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be 
manipulated out of existence. 
Frost v. R.R. Comm'n of California, 271 U.S. 583, 593-594 (1926). 
Here, the statute purporting to authorize warrantless, forcible blood draws based 
on implied consent granted by the driver in exchange for the privilege of driving on 
Idaho's roadways, and this Court's interpretation to the same effect, are precisely the 
type of compulsion rejected by the United States Supreme Court. "If the State may 
compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like 
manner compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the 
Constitution of the United States may be manipulated out of existence." Id. Compelled 
consent to warrantless searches of one's body as a condition of driving a car is 
unreasonable and a violation of due process, which cannot be countenanced. 
Moreover, a forcible blood draw like the one conducted here in reliance on 
"implied consent" is unreasonable and violates due process because it involves the 
State obtaining evidence from an individual by violating an individual's most cherished 
right to autonomy and privacy in his or her own skin. It does so in a nonconsensual, 
forcible manner that offends not only a sense of justice, but which "shocks the 
conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-173 (1952). "So here, to sanction 
the brutal conduct which naturally enough was condemned by the court whose 
judgment is before us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing would be 
more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a society." Id. at 
174; see also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985) (forcing defendant to undergo 
23 
surgery so state could recover a bullet that was evidence in the defendant's felony 
prosecution would be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment). Thus, a 
forced blood draw based on "implied consent" is unreasonable in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment and the Due Process Clause. 
E. In Conclusion. Mr. Briggs' Forcible Blood Test Results Should Have Been 
Suppressed Because The Constitutional Protections Outlined By Schmerber Did 
Not Exist In This Case And, Therefore, The Test Violated The Fourth 
Amendment 
In summary, under Schmerber, a warrantless blood draw is constitutionally 
permissible only where an officer has probable cause to believe an individual involved in 
an injury accident was under the influence of alcohol, and the officer has no time to 
obtain a warrant to seize the quickly dissipating evidence. Mr. Briggs' case involves a 
simple DUI without an injury accident. He revoked his implied consent and the forcible 
removal of his blood was not taken voluntary. Moreover, as will be further explained in 
section II, and incorporated herein as if fully argued, no exigent circumstances existed 
that excuse the requirement to obtain a warrant. Thus, under Schmerber, Mr. Briggs' 
warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment. 
II. 
Assuming Schmerber Permits Nonconsensual, Warrantless Blood Draws In Simple DUI 
Offenses Not Involving An Injury Or Accident. The State Failed To Prove Exigent 
Circumstances Justified Subverting The Warrant Requirement In Mr. Briggs' Case 
A. Introduction 
When Mr. Briggs refused Officer Case's requests to submit first to a breath test 
and then to a blood draw, five officers held him down and forcibly drew his blood. The 
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officers did not have a warrant permitting the seizure of Mr. Briggs' blood, and the State 
offered no evidence demonstrating the officers made any attempt to obtain one. In 
addition, the State failed to present any evidence that the warrantless blood draw was 
justified by exigent circumstances. As a result, the warrantless seizure of Mr. Briggs' 
blood was unconstitutional and the results must be suppressed. 
B. The State Failed To Demonstrate Exigent Circumstances Justified Dispensing 
With The Warrant Requirement 
Assuming Schmerber applies to simple DUI offenses which do not involve an 
injury or accident, like the one with which Mr. Briggs was charged, and further assuming 
Officer Case had probable cause to arrest Mr. Briggs for driving under the influence, the 
State still bore the burden of proving that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless 
blood draw. An exigent circumstance is one in which "the facts known at the time of the 
[warrantless] entry indicate a 'compelling need for official action and no time to secure a 
warrant."' State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485-486, 163 P.3d 1194, 1197-1198 (2007) 
(quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978)); State v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 
504, 975 P.2d 789, 792 (1999) ("The exigent circumstances exception refers broadly to 
fact patterns sufficient to excuse an officer from the requirement of obtaining a warrant 
to conduct a search for which he has probable cause." (citations omitted) (internal 
quotations omitted)). The scope of a warrantless entry or search premised on probable 
cause and exigent circumstances is limited by the exigency that justified the warrantless 
entry or search at the outset. Smith, 144 Idaho at 487, 163 P.3d at 1199 (citations 
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omitted). The dissipation of blood alcohol is not sufficient, in and of itself, to constitute 
exigent circumstances.8 See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 156 P.3d 771 (Utah 2007). 
Here, Mr. Briggs was seized after an off duty officer observed Mr. Briggs' vehicle 
come into contact with "the chain that divides the parking lot with the pedestrian 
sidewalk" and drive up onto the sidewalk. (Prelim. Tr., p.7, Ls.17-25, p.9, Ls.1-20.)9 
Officer Case, the responding officer, testified that Mr. Briggs' "speech was slurred. He 
was loud and sloppy in his speech and movements. Very strong odor of alcoholic 
beverage, bloodshot glassy eyes, and he had urinated in his pants." (Prelim Tr., p.17, 
Ls.4-16.) Mr. Briggs refused to exit the vehicle and would not take a breath test. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.17, L.20 - p.18, L.18.) Officer Case then advised Mr. Briggs that he 
would be taken for a blood draw. (Prelim. Tr., p.18, Ls.14-16.) 
Officer Case testified as to Mr. Briggs' conduct while sitting in the back of the 
patrol car after being informed he would be taken for a blood draw: 
He wouldn't sit back in the seat. Laid there on the seat kicking at 
us. We were able to catch his legs. He wouldn't fold them up so we could 
close the door. I eventually had to hit him in the back of the knee to get 
that leg to fold up, and we got that done, but as soon as I closed the door, 
he pushed off of that door, stuck his head and shoulders off out the other 
door and now the fight is on to try to get that door closed. Absolutely 
refused to cooperate, just screaming, yelling, cussing, swearing. We 
eventually managed to get him sitting up enough to close the door and 
transported him to the EIRMC. 
(Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.6-17.) Once officers arrived got to EIRMC, Mr. Briggs "refused to 
exit the vehicle. We had to actually pull him out and put him face down on a gurney to 
get him inside the hospital for the blood draw." (Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.20-23.) Ultimately, 
8 See footnote 7. 
9 The 12/19/10 transcript of Mr. Briggs' preliminary hearing is cited herein as "Prelim. 
Tr.," for ease of reference. 
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once the phlebotomist arrived, Mr. Briggs had to be held down by five officers to 
complete the blood draw. (Prelim Tr., p.20, Ls.4-10.) 
There is nothing in Officer Case's testimony that demonstrates there was a 
compelling need for the immediate seizure of Mr. Briggs' blood, and no evidence that 
the officers were unable to obtain a warrant. 10 In Idaho, warrants can be obtained 
telephonically, which is presumably quicker than obtaining a warrant in person. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4404: 
In lieu of a written affidavit, the magistrate may take an oral statement 
under oath which shall be recorded and transcribed. The judge is 
authorized to administer an oath or affirmation by telephone, and to take 
testimony by telephone. All testimony given over the telephone that is 
intended to support an application for a search warrant must be given on 
oath or affirmation and must identify the person testifying. The affidavit or 
oral testimony as recorded must be filed with the clerk of the court. 
Thereafter, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4406: 
Id. 
If the affidavit for the warrant is related to the court telephonically, the 
magistrate may verbally authorize a peace officer to sign the magistrate's 
name on a duplicate original warrant, which verbal authorization shall be 
recorded and transcribed. After service of the warrant, this duplicate 
original warrant must be returned to the magistrate who authorized the 
signing of his name on it. The magistrate shall then endorse his name and 
enter the date on the warrant when it is returned to him. Any failure of the 
magistrate to make such an endorsement does not in itself invalidate the 
warrant. 
Nothing in the testimony of Officer Case demonstrates that either made an effort 
to obtain a warrant, or that they were otherwise unable to do so. Given the availability 
of the telephonic warrant, it is particularly problematic that the troopers made no effort 
whatsoever to obtain a warrant. Thus, the State failed to present sufficient evidence to 
10 See Footnote 6. 
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demonstrate exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search. Accordingly, the 
district court erred in denying Mr. Briggs' motion to suppress the illegally obtained blood 
evidence. 
111. 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Briggs' Motion To Suppress The Results Of 
The Forcible Blood Draw Because It Was Unreasonable Under The Circumstances 
Assuming arguendo that the forcible blood draw constitutes a recognized 
exception to the warrant requirement, the forcible blood draw must still be reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I section 13 of the 
Idaho Constitution. In Schmerber, the United States Supreme Court stated: 
The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society. 
That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor 
intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in 
no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions 
under other conditions. 
384 U.S. at 772. The Supreme Court specifically stated that "[l]t would be a different 
case if the police initiated the violence, refused to respect a reasonable request to 
undergo a different form of testing, or responded to resistance with inappropriate force." 
Id. at 760 n.4. The Supreme Court incorporated this Fourteenth Amendment analysis 
into its discussion of the reasonableness requirement under its Fourth Amendment 
analysis. Id. Even Idaho case law recognizes that when the warrantless search falls 
within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the search and seizure 
must still be reasonable in light of all of the surrounding circumstances. Diaz, 144 Idaho 
at 302, 160 P.3d at 741. 
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In this case, Mr. Briggs' forcible blood draw was unreasonable. As is set forth 
above, Mr. Briggs repeatedly resisted all contact by officers, so much so Officer Case 
struck Mr. Briggs in the back of his knee with his baton to get the doors of the police 
cruiser shut. (Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.6-17.) Throughout the entire period, Mr. Briggs was 
extremely hostile toward the officers. (Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.6-17.) Then, once they 
arrived to the EIRMC, Mr. Briggs refused to exit the vehicle and officers had to drag him 
out of the police cruiser and place him face down on a gurney, all while Mr. Briggs 
continued to threaten officers and hospital staff. (Prelim. Tr., p.19, Ls.20-23, p.20, Ls.1-
3.) Then, it took five officers to hold Mr. Briggs down so the phlebotomist could 
complete the blood draw. (Prelim Tr., p.20, Ls.4-10; Tr., p.11, Ls.2-5, p.14, Ls.24-25.) 
Mr. Briggs asserts that the Fourth Amendment does not authorize police in a 
standard DUI to use five officers to force a suspect to hold still enough that a 
phlebotomist could forcibly stick a needle in his arm to obtain blood. The Constitution 
requires more. The Constitution requires reasonableness, and the forcible blood draw 
here was unreasonable. Mr. Briggs asks this Court to hold that the police officers' 
conduct was unreasonable. The blood test violated Mr. Briggs' constitutional rights to 
be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Briggs respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's order denying 
his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 15th day of October, 2010. ~ 
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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